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Over the past fifty years, America has steadily deinstitutional-
ized' its mentally handicapped population, often with mixed re-
* William A. Henry III is credited with the first use of the term "outing" to
connote exposing a person's sexual orientation against that person's wishes. William
A. Henry III, Forcing Gays Out of the Closet, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 67. Generally, I
characterize the practice of outing as revealing any private fact without consent. Thus,
in this article I use the term outing to describe the public revelation of one's mental
handicap or disability without one's consent. For a fuller discussion of the concept, at
least as it relates to sexual orientation, see Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of
Publicly Outing Private People, 73 ORE. L. REV. 159 (1994).
"Madman" is obviously not a term of endearment. Insane persons, or those who
have mental disabilities, have almost always been publicly described in a pejorative
fashion. For example, "madman" has been defined as "a man who is or acts insane,"
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 715 (1990), and as "one who is
insane; a lunatic," VOL. IX, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 176 (2d ed. 1989). A
"madhouse" has been described as "a place of uproar and confusion," WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 715, and as "[a] house set apart for the
reception and detention of the insane; a lunatic asylum," VOL. IX, THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 176 (2d ed. 1989). My purpose in using the term "madman" is
to illustrate the general and continuing public perception that mentally challenged
people are not "normal" and are, therefore, unworthy of trust. Although there has
been a trend toward the use of the term "mentally challenged," I have chosen to use
the term "mentally handicapped" because it reflects current use in the law and in
related literature.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of my
colleague, Joel Finer, in suggesting some of the ideas that led to the completion of this
material. In addition, I want to thank my secretary, Rosa DelVecchio, Ph.D., for her
excellent assistance in proofreading this article.
1. John Maurice Grimes, a physician, was probably the first person to coin the
phrase, "deinstitutionalization," in his work, INSTITUTIONAL CARE OF MENTAL PA-
TIENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 113 (Arno 1980) (1934). Grimes' study came out of a
panel he headed at the behest of the American Medical Association ("AMA") when
it decided to develop an official policy concerning institutional care of the insane.
ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM 18-20 (1990). There are numerous works
and reports that discuss the deinstitutionalization movement. They include: Richard
Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193 (1980); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Note, Zoning for
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SUits. 2 The primary goal of this process was to place these long-
forgotten people back into the so-called mainstream of American
life,3 allowing them access to the same kinds of advantages-
schools, jobs, housing-that most of us take for granted. This road
has not always been easy.4 In particular, providing safe and acces-
sible housing for the mentally handicapped is an important step
toward establishing meaningful self-sufficiency for these individu-
als. However, to ensure that the needs of all tenants are fulfilled,
several potential conflicts between the mentally handicapped ten-
ant and other tenants must be resolved.
the Mentally Ill, A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 853 (1979); Michael L.
Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginaliza-
tion, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63 (1991). More than fifty years ago, attempts at deinstitution-
alization were chronicled in works like A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA (1949).
2. One author's take on the issue of deinstitutionalization:
Another critical dimension was the functional responsibility that came
with the deinstitutionalization movement. The need for food, housing, medi-
cal care, recreation, income, vocation, which had been provided for by the
hospital, continued as needs in the community. For many of these patients,
life outside of the institution was characterized by a state of prolonged or
chronic dependency. Prolonged difficulties in functioning also meant re-
peated struggles in securing or holding onto the resources to meet basic
needs. The community mental health centers, which were expected to de-
velop the treatment follow-up and alternatives to hospitalization, were in no
position to respond to the full range of basic needs of these seriously dis-
turbed people. Hence, the multiple needs of this dependent, deinstitutional-
ized population fell to other institutions of the community and the
community at large.
PHYLLIS L. SOLOMON, ET AL., COMMUNITY SERVICES To DISCHARGED PSYCHIATRIC
PATIENTS, 12 (1984); see also ANDREW T. SCULL, DECARCERATION, COMMUNITY
TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW (1977) (arguing that deinstitu-
tionalization reduced the level of services available to the mentally ill); SHELDON
GELMAN, MEDICATING SCHIZOPHRENIA (1999) (arguing that the psychiatric profes-
sion has systematically understated the side effects and overstated the benefits of anti-
schizophrenia medication).
3. RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 67-85
(1990).
4. Isaac and Armat have found that public mental hospitals are eager to dis-
charge patients and often show little interest in where patients go.
The New York State Office of Mental Health's own survey for 1979-80 found
that 23% of mental patients were released to "unknown" living arrange-
ments .... Merion Kane, an articulate Washington, D.C. resident, reports
that her son was twice discharged from St. Elizabeth's Hospital with a trash
bag containing his belongings, a token and the address of a shelter. It re-
mains a common practice for hospitals to release patients directly to shelters.
Id. at 7-8. (citations omitted).
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Picture this: Tenant, who is mentally handicapped within the
meaning of the Fair Housing Amendments Act,5 completes an ap-
plication to live in a rental unit in an apartment owned by Land-
lord. Tenant reveals to Landlord, or Landlord is otherwise
informed-perhaps by Tenant's social worker-that Tenant's hand-
icap requires Tenant to take regular doses of medication to prevent
violent outbursts. Or, alternatively, Landlord becomes aware that
Tenant, although mentally handicapped, has no real potential for
violence so long as Tenant attends regular counseling sessions. If,
however, Tenant fails to take medication, or go to counseling, the
likely result is that Tenant will engage in violent and potentially
dangerous conduct.
At Tenant's request, Landlord does not disclose the nature of
Tenant's handicap to other tenants. A few weeks after moving in,
Tenant fails to take his medication, to go to regular counseling, or
both, and without provocation, attacks another tenant, seriously in-
juring that tenant. Thereafter, the injured tenant sues Landlord for
damages on the basis that Landlord's prior knowledge of Tenant's
possible propensities toward violent behavior made Tenant's act
foreseeable and thus Landlord had a duty to warn and protect the
other tenants from Tenant's act. From the injured tenant's per-
spective, Landlord should be held liable for the new Tenant's ac-
tions and be required to compensate the injured tenant for any
injuries incurred because of Tenant's acts.
A situation like this places Landlord in a quandary. Landlord's
failure to inform the other tenants about Tenant's condition may
render Landlord liable for the violent act perpetrated by the handi-
capped tenant if there had indeed been a breach of some duty to
warn other tenants of potential violent activity. On the other hand,
if Landlord had disclosed Tenant's condition to the other tenants,
Landlord would have risked attempts by the other tenants to va-
cate their units or warn off other potential tenants from the prem-
ises, resulting in economic harm to Landlord's business. Disclosure
of Tenant's "secret" also would have exposed Landlord to potential
legal action from Tenant, who, as a handicapped person, could sue
Landlord for discriminatory practices under the Fair Housing
5. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430 (1988)
amended the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631 (1994), also known as
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Throughout this paper I will sometimes
refer to this legislation as the FHAA or, simply, the Act. See generally Part II infra.
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Amendments Act, or bring a cause of action based on a breach of
Tenant's privacy rights.6
This article will explore the serious potential for a clash between
two sets of values: (1) the stated values of the Act, that persons
handicapped within its terms should not be denied access to decent
housing on that account, and that mentally handicapped tenants,
especially those who may have, but do not necessarily possess, a
propensity for violence, have privacy rights; and (2) the landlord's
responsibilities with respect to the safety needs of other tenants.
To answer these questions, I will address a number of policies,
including those embodied in federal and state statutes relating to
the rights of mentally handicapped persons. In particular, I will
analyze policies underlying the Fair Housing Amendments Act
that seek to enable mentally handicapped persons to select decent
housing and require landlords to "reasonably accommodate"7 their
needs. I will explore analogous cases involving reasonable accom-
modation for handicapped persons under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act.8 Furthermore, I will examine whether handicapped
6. This scenario is loosely based on the real life dilemma that confronted Rose-
ann Beckert, a Cleveland, Ohio resident who applied to be put on the waiting list for
rental housing at Our Lady of Angels Apartments ("OLA"), a non-profit corporation
providing housing and related activities to the elderly and physically handicapped
pursuant to § 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959. Although she did not initially
disclose her handicap to OLA, when Ms. Beckert completed a preliminary application
for residence status, she did indicate that her handicap was a "mental-schizo" condi-
tion for which she took two medications.
OLA denied Ms. Beckert's application because she was neither elderly nor physi-
cally handicapped and therefore ineligible for residence in the OLA facility. In real-
ity, Ms. Beckert's lawyers took the position that her application was denied because
of OLA's fear that Ms. Beckert, if she failed to medicate, might pose a danger to
other OLA residents.
Beckert filed suit against OLA, alleging that she had been discriminated against in
violation of the Fair Housing Amendment Act's prohibitions against handicapped dis-
crimination. Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 603 (6th
Cir. 1999). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted OLA
summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
district court, declaring that § 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959 allowed resi-
dence sponsors to serve some, but not all, qualified groups of handicapped persons,
and that the 1959 Act was neither superceded nor effectively repealed by the FHAA.
Id. at 607. Notwithstanding the Beckert result, it still remains to be seen what will
happen in a similar situation when the provisions of the FHAA and not the 1959 Act
govern the housing provider.
7. The Fair Housing Act states that it is unlawful with respect to a handicapped
person to refuse "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use or enjoy a dwelling ...." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). While certain aspects of the issue I will discuss in-
volve analogies to situations involving the physician's duty to warn as well as the
786
OUTING THE MADMAN
tenants have a right to privacy with respect to their handicap and
whether that right is breached if the landlord informs other tenants
of their condition.
In the context of this potential conflict, the traditional view of
property law, which does not hold landlords liable for the criminal
acts of third parties, must be re-examined in light of the introduc-
tion of a new population into housing that had up to now generally
been denied them. Because the circumstances are particularly
problematic in situations where the landlord's traditional lack of
liability for the criminal acts of third parties conflicts with his actual
knowledge of a tenant's propensity for violence when not medi-
cated or counseled, I will examine cases involving the landlord's
actual knowledge of criminal activity.
This article will conclude that a landlord's disclosure of a men-
tally handicapped tenant's disability, including a propensity toward
violence under certain circumstances, to other tenants is unlawful
because such disclosure violates the disabled person's right to
evenhanded treatment under general property law principles, in-
fringes upon the disabled person's privacy rights, and is an implicit
violation of policies embodied in the Fair Housing Amendments
Act.
I. THE LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF
THIRD PARTIES
A. DTaditional Liability Rules
Pursuant to long-standing common law rules, landlords have no
liability for tenant injuries caused by the violent or criminal acts of
third parties. 9 Such thinking primarily has been grounded in the
time-honored view of the relationship between the landlord and
tenant, predicated on the lease. Traditionally, upon the execution
of the lease, the landlord walked away, leaving the tenant to fend
for himself. That is not the case in modern times.
Contemporary leases have evolved from what began essentially
as a conveyance of real property, usually a farm, for a specified
current wave of sexual predator reporting laws, these subjects are beyond the scope of
this article.
9. Marvin M. Moore, The Landlord's Liability to His Tenants for Injuries Crimi-
nally Inflicted by Third Persons, 17 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1984); Goldberg v. Hous.
Auth., 186 A.2d 291 (1962) (holding that the housing authority had no duty to provide
police protection at the housing project with upwards of 6000 residents and twelve
buildings on nineteen acres, and thus was not liable for injuries suffered by the plain-
tiff who was beaten and robbed at 1:30 p.m. in a service elevator while delivering milk
to a tenant).
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period of time."° In this context, the landlord was not required to
provide property in good repair or to maintain it, and the lessee
could accept or reject the property in its then current condition."
In such circumstances, it was not considered to be particularly on-
erous for a tenant to take responsibility for his personal security or
anything else involving the leased premises.12 In effect, landlords
and tenants were to be treated as strangers 3-generally a relation-
ship requiring no duty of protection.'4 This point of view held sway
in this country well into the 1960s.
B. Evolution of the Landlord's Liability
Primarily spearheaded by an idealistic and strong-willed group
of Legal Services attorneys, and promoted by some of its own inno-
vative judges,' 5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals led the
way toward a new conception of landlord-tenant relationships, at
least with respect to residential leases. A trio of District of Colum-
10. JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 195-198 (2d ed.
1975); CORNELEUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
71-76 (2d ed. 1987).
11. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law,
23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 510-511 (1982).
12. Moore, supra note 9, at 395; Caroline Hudson, Recent Development, Ex-
panding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's Duty to Pro-
tect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493, 1495-1496
(1980). The traditional view of the landlord-tenant relationship is illustrated by Mary
Ann Glendon:
In the classical scheme, the landlord's principal obligations related to posses-
sion and the tenant's to rent. Thus, the landlord was obliged to give the ten-
ant at least good title and a clear right to possession at the commencement
of the term. During the term, the tenant had the right to expect that his
possession would not be materially disturbed by the landlord, anyone acting
under the landlord's authority, or anyone with a title paramount to that of
the landlord. This right, inherent in the tenant's estate, came to be expressed
as the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment. The landlord had no obligation
to deliver the premises in any particular physical condition or state of repair,
and a fortiori, no duty to maintain or repair them during the term. The lessee
was expected to examine the premises and decide for himself whether they
were fit for his purposes. After the lease was entered, as after a sale, the risk
of loss or deterioration belonged to the lessee. Thus, even if the premises
were destroyed or rendered unfit for the tenant's purposes during the lease
term, the tenant's obligations to pay rent in principle continued unaffected.
Glendon, supra note 11, at 510-511.
13. B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Im-
posing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
679, 685 (1992).
14. Id.; see also W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 375 (5th ed. 1984).
15. Glendon, supra note 11, at 521-522.
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bia Court of Appeals cases, decided in the 1960s and 1970s, are
credited with tipping the balance of power in the landlord-tenant
relationship toward tenants.
First, in Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co.,16 the court af-
forded the tenant the opportunity to recover damages for injuries
caused by a falling ceiling, primarily based on the landlord's viola-
tion of a housing code.' 7 Later, in Edwards v. Habib,'8 an eviction
action, the tenant successfully defended against the landlord's ac-
tion for possession by effectively proving retaliatory eviction.' 9
Finally, with the development of the implied warranty of habita-
bility in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,2 the landlord-tenant
relationship gradually switched from complete landlord domina-
tion to a relationship with at least some semblance of parity. In
Javins, the court did away with a trio of common law rules: (1) the
landlord's lack of duties with respect to the physical condition of
the premises; (2) the independence of the tenant's obligation to
pay rent from the landlord's obligations with respect to the prem-
ises; and (3) the constructive eviction requirement of complete va-
cation of the premises.2'
As a result of cases like these, landlord tort liability for tenant
injuries was no longer unattainable. Now, "in almost every juris-
diction, courts impose on landlords a duty of care relating to the
condition of leased residential premises. Moreover, the scope of
this duty has been expanded from its initial focus on the physical
condition of the premises to its current concern with overall resi-
dential safety. 22
16. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
17. Id.
18. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
19. Id. at 700. With respect to the retaliatory eviction issue, the court stated:
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress' explicit di-
rection for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive congressional
concern to secure for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and
sanitary, place to live. Effective implementation and enforcement of the
codes obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of viola-
tions. Though there is no official procedure for the filing of such complaints,
the bureaucratic structure of the Department of Licenses and Inspections
establishes such a procedure, and for fiscal year 1966 nearly a third of the
cases handled by the Department arose from private complaints. To permit
retaliatory evictions, then, would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the
housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing in Washington.
Id.
20. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Javins is generally credited with the develop-
ment of this doctrine.
21. Glendon, supra note 11, at 5.
22. Glesner, supra note 13, at 685.
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Ramsay v. Morrissette13 and Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Apartment Corp.24 generally are credited with leading the way for
the imposition of landlord liability for the criminal acts of third
parties. Ramsay involved a suit brought by a tenant against her
landlord after an intruder forced his way into her apartment and
assaulted her.25 The Ramsay court held that there were circum-
stances in which the landlord did have a duty to protect tenants or
their property from the criminal acts of third parties. 26 Although
thin on analysis,27 the court's holding in Ramsay paved the way for
Kline, which still is regarded as the primary case involving the im-
position of landlord liability for the criminal acts of third parties.28
Kline began as an action against an apartment corporation for
damages for injuries sustained after a tenant was criminally as-
saulted in the common hallway of an apartment house.29 The Kline
court recognized the general rule that a private person has no duty
to protect another from the criminal acts of third parties.30 Never-
theless, the Kline court imposed landlord liability for the criminal
assault upon the tenant: the usual rules did not apply in situations
involving contemporary urban apartment living.3
23. 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1968).
24. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
25. Ramsay, 252 A.2d at 511.
26. Id. at 512-513. In reversing the landlord's trial motion for summary judgment,
the Ramsay court cited Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (1973). Kendall in-
volved a mentally deranged person, the landlord's employee, who strangled to death
the tenant of an apartment the employee was painting. Id. at 675. Landlord negli-
gence was based on the landlord's failure to do a background check on the employee.
Id. at 681-84.
27. Other than quoting Kendall, there is very little in the Ramsay case that sheds
light on why the trial court's decision was reversed. Essentially, it appears that the
appeals court was reluctant to rule on the merits because of defects in procedure.
Ramsay, 252 A.2d at 511-12.
28. Glesner, supra note 13, at 689.
29. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478-79 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
30. Id. at 481 (cataloguing reasons for the rule).
31. Id. at 487.
[T]he rationale of this very broad general rule falters when it is applied to
the conditions of modern day urban apartment living, particularly in the cir-
cumstances of this case. The rationale of the general rule exonerating a third
party from any duty to protect another from a criminal attack has no appli-
cability to the landlord-tenant relationship in multiple dwelling houses. The
landlord is no insurer of his tenant's safety, but he certainly is no bystander.
And where, as here, the landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults
and robberies, has notice that these crimes occurred in the portion of the
premises exclusively within his control, has every reason to expect like
crimes to happen again, and has the exclusive power to take preventive ac-
tion, it does not seem unfair to place upon the landlord a duty to take those
790
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Most of the cases decided post-Kline concern landlords who had
prior knowledge of similar conduct occurring on the premises.32
Numerous courts have tended to invoke landlord liability when ev-
idence of prior criminal activities on the leased premises has been
demonstrated.
Prior knowledge necessarily implies some element of foreseeabil-
ity. Thus, a landlord's ultimate responsibility for tenant injuries de-
pends upon the landlord's prior knowledge of criminal activities
and whether the landlord has sufficient knowledge to foresee such
activities and take preventive action. In many cases, a landlord's
liability relates to the landlord's ability to keep the common physi-
cal premises under the landlord's control by making them reasona-
bly safe and keeping them in good repair.
Thus, in Bryant v. Brannen,33 a case involving a tenant who sued
his landlord after the tenant was shot by the landlord's building
manager, the Michigan Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the
trial court's determination of landlord liability on the basis that the
incident essentially took place in the tenant's own apartment, not
in a common area of the building, and that the manager was not
acting within the scope of his employment. 34 The court empha-
sized that the landlord, like any other business owner, could not
control the incidence of crime in the general community.35 It is
important to note that Bryant involved an isolated incident be-
tween a tenant and a building manager who knew each other.36
Many courts have begun to take a different view when the facts
indicate generalized criminal activity on or near the leased
premises.37
steps which are within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his
tenants.
Id.
32. E.g, Smith v. Gen. Apartment Co., 213 S.E.2d 74, 75-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)
(reversing the trial court's summary judgment for a landlord in a tenant rape case, and
citing Ramsay on the issue of the landlord's alleged prior knowledge of similar
incidents).
33. 446 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
34. Id. at 852-53. Bryant continued to indicate, however, that landlords remain
liable to the extent foreseeable criminal acts are facilitated by their failure to keep the
common areas reasonably safe or in good repair. Id. at 851.
35. Id. at 851.
36. Id. at 849.
37. E.g., Tenney v. Atd. Assocs., 594 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1999) (finding that a land-
lord who had notice of a past burglary had a duty to take reasonable measures to
protect tenants from foreseeable criminal conduct and was thus liable in damages for
a resident's rape by an intruder).
2001]
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Prior knowledge and foreseeability, however, do not always lead
directly to liability. Some courts still hold that it is fundamentally
unfair to impose a duty of protection on the landlord. For exam-
ple, in Bartley v. Sweetser,38 a tenant who had been raped asserted
that the landlord breached a duty to provide reasonable security
from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.39 The court held
that absent a statute or lease agreement provision, the duty did not
exist and that there were still sound reasons for not disturbing the
long-standing common law rule. These rationales included:
a. Judicial reluctance to tamper with the common law concept
of the landlord-tenant relationship;
b. The notion that the act of a third party in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superceding cause of harm to
another;
c. The often difficult problem of determining the foreseeability
of criminal acts;
d. The vagueness of the standard the landlord must meet;
e. The economic consequences of the imposition of the duty;
and
f. The conflict with the public policy allocating the duty of pro-
tecting citizens from criminal acts to the government rather
than the private sector.4°
Although Justice Newbern, concurring with the majority in Bar-
tley, intimated that in a proper case the court would consider hold-
ing the landlord liable for a criminal act committed by a third
party,4' most modern cases involving attacks by third parties on
tenants result in no liability for landlords. These decisions are
based primarily on the lack of foreseeability, particularly in the ab-
sence of similar incidents on the premises, or the landlord's knowl-
edge of them.42
38. Bartley v. Sweetser, 890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994).
39. Id. at 250.
40. Id. at 251-252 (citing ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LAND-
LORD TENANT § 4.14 (1980)); see also Bryant, 446 N.W.2d at 847. In Bryant the court
remained convinced that a landlord should remain liable to tenants for injuries to the
extent that foreseeable criminal acts of third parties are facilitated by the landlord's
failure to keep the physical premises under the landlord's control reasonably safe and
in good repair. Id. at 850-52. Nevertheless, the court found no liability against the
landlord when the landlord's building manager shot the tenant on the premises. Id. at
855.
41. Bartley, 890 S.W.2d at 252.
42. E.g., Sharon P. v. Arman, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (Cal. 1999) (finding no landlord
liability for an unforeseeable attack in a parking garage); Soto v. 2101. Realty Co., 699
N.Y.S.2d 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding landlord not liable for an assault in his
building's lobby where he had insufficient notice of any prior criminal activity); Post
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C. Landlord Liability for Knowledge of a Tenant's Mental
Condition
It seems a fairly simple proposition to impose landlord liability
for criminal tenant-on-tenant attacks when the landlord has previ-
ous knowledge, constructive or actual, of previous criminal con-
duct. It is a more difficult proposition in situations where the
landlord knows of a tenant's condition but lacks notice of any pre-
vious aberrant conduct. Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building,
Inc.,4 3 a Michigan case, is illustrative of the problem.
Samson involved an attack in a commercial building by a mental
patient undergoing psychiatric treatment at the state mental health
clinic that leased spaced in the building." The victim, an employee
of another tenant in the building, was robbed and stabbed in a
building elevator by the mental health clinic outpatient."5 The vic-
tim and her husband sued the landlord; the jury verdict for the vic-
tim and her husband was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court
of Michigan, primarily on the basis that the landlord had not acted
reasonably in the circumstances. 6
While he sympathized with the fate of the victim, Justice Levin
wrote a vigorous dissent in Samson, focusing primarily on the
rights of mentally handicapped persons. 47 Justice Levin pointed
out that the vast majority of mental patients, once on "convales-
cent leave," are not considered dangerous. 8 He further took issue
with the majority's approach to the mentally ill in general, stating:
Properties, Inc. v. Doe, 495 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (finding landlord not
negligent in the rape of a tenant inside her apartment). On the other hand, at least
one landlord settled for $1.5 million after mediation in a case involving the beating,
choking, and rape of a tenant. Landlord Pays $1.5 Million to Settle Tenant's Rape
Case, LANDLORD LAW REP., May 2000, at 1.
43. 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
44. Id. at 845.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 850.
The fact that such an event might occur in the future was foreseeable to
this defendant. It had even been brought to its attention by other tenants in
the building. The magnitude of the risk, that of a criminally insane person
running amok within an office building filled with tenants and invitees, was
substantial to say the least. To hold that, possessed of these facts and no
other, this defendant should have inquired further into the reasonableness of
its inaction, i.e., the probability of such an event occurring in the future, and
that its failure to make such an inquiry may be deemed negligence on its
part, does not shock the conscience of this Court.
Id. at 849-850.
47. Id. at 851-56.
48. Id. at 853.
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This Court imposes on the owner of a building who rents
space to a mental health clinic a duty to provide "some security
measures."
This suggests an archaic, unfounded fear of all persons who
have been in mental institutions. Most persons afflicted with
mental illness need not be confined indefinitely. With treat-
ment, they can return to the community. Medical knowledge
and human understanding have advanced beyond the time when
the mentally ill were considered burdens to be cared for, but for
whom cure was impossible. In requiring landlords to treat with
suspicion persons who formerly suffered mental illness even af-
ter mental health officials have certified them ready to resume
life in the community, this Court undermines this salutary and
humanitarian advance and perpetuates the isolation of the men-
tally ill.
While we may take judicial notice of isolated incidents of vio-
lence committed by persons released from mental hospitals, we
also note that persons without such a history commit violent acts
and that countless former mental patients have successfully
reentered society.49
Justice Levin's dissent in Samson clearly indicates that he would
have opposed a landlord's disclosure of a tenant's mental handicap
to other tenants. For Justice Levin, the issue is not so much the
invasion of privacy rights, but rather, a concern with basic fairness
to a group of persons, members of which would have no greater
propensity for violence than those of any other group.5 ° If Justice
Levin's position is reasonable, then a landlord who discloses a ten-
ant's mental handicap to others is violating the disabled tenant's
basic right to evenhanded treatment. When combined with possi-
ble privacy rights violations, an even stronger case is made for non-
disclosure. 1
Justice Levin's position was echoed twelve years later in Gill v.
New York City Housing Authority. 2 In Gill, a tenant of a Housing
Authority project was stabbed by a mentally unbalanced tenant. 3
The injured tenant sued the Housing Authority, primarily on the
basis that the authority had failed to check into the assailant's
mental condition prior to allowing him to become a tenant in the
housing project.5 4 In a holding that could be viewed as beneficial
49. Id.
50. Id. at 853-54.
51. For a discussion of privacy rights, see Part III infra.
52. 519 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1987).




to the rights of the mentally handicapped, butpossibly detrimental
to the rights of injured tenants, the court held: (1) the housing au-
thority was under no duty to investigate the assailant's mental con-
dition; (2) the authority had no duty to perform a detailed check
into the assailant's mental condition, treatment, or medication; (3)
the authority was not responsible for all acts of violence which oc-
curred on the premises; and (4) the assailant's attack was
unforeseeable.
Most notable about Gill is Justice Murphy's discussion of men-
tally ill tenants and the landlord's duty to them as well as to other
tenants. First, the justice noted that a person discharged from a
psychiatric institution with appropriate after-care provisions is pre-
sumptively not a danger to himself or to others. 6 Second, Justice
Murphy indicated that the type of background check urged by the
plaintiff would have been "grossly violative" of the civil rights of
the assailant and his family. 7 Last, and most important, Justice
Murphy discussed the larger ramifications of affirming the trial
court's decision in favor of the victim:
The practical consequences of an affirmance in this case
would be devastating. The Housing Authority would be forced
to conduct legally offensive and completely unwarranted "fol-
low-ups" of all of those tenants within its projects known to
have a psychiatric condition possibly, but it must be noted, not
foreseeably, injurious to another tenant. Once the "follow-up"
had been conducted, the Housing Authority would then be obli-
gated to look into its crystal ball to assess the likelihood of harm
and then, where indicated, to take protective measures for
which it has no expertise or authority. These would include dis-
pensing medication, monitoring treatment, posting warnings
(i.e., "Beware of your neighbor"), or evicting tenants. Given the
options, eviction, which is described in the Housing Authority
Management Manual as a "last resort," would become almost
commonplace. Those with psychiatric disorders would be dis-
possessed from their low income accommodations to live in the
streets. The equally unacceptable alternative would be for the
Housing Authority to expose itself to staggering liability.58
55. Id. at 365; see also Wright v. New York City Housing Auth., 624 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1995) (holding that a landlord is under no duty to safeguard a tenant against an
attack by another tenant).
56. Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
57. Id. at 368-69.
58. Id. at 372.
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Although it is unlikely that the magnitude of the issues con-
fronted by a public housing authority in a case like Gill would chal-
lenge most private residential landlords with respect to mentally
handicapped tenants, the concerns voiced by Justice Murphy over
the onerous task of monitoring one's mentally handicapped tenants
is just as real.
H. FAIR HOUSING AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR
HANDICAPPED PERSONS
A. Deinstitutionalization of Mentally Handicapped Persons
Housing rights for mentally handicapped persons cannot readily
be discussed outside the context of the shift in such persons' status
from a class of largely institutionalized persons to a class of resi-
dence seekers. Today, the primary public policy approach toward
the mentally handicapped involves a presumption in favor of dein-
stitutionalization. This change came about less easily and less ra-
tionally than might appear. According to one commentator:
The idea that deinstitutionalization was a piece of deliberate
social planning seems so rational and so obvious as to go with-
out saying, to people both in and out of the mental health field.
It's not true. Deinstitutionalization, which did not even have a
name when it happened, was the product of only dimly related
forces: the "can-do" postwar American mood, which was one of
optimism, faith in the future, and enthusiasm for scientific
breakthroughs; the latest in the long line of shocking expos6s of
heinous conditions in state mental hospitals, which appeared in
the late 1940's and the early 1950's; the organized activity of the
states, which had recognized that the costs to them of lifetime
care for the chronically mentally ill were prohibitive; and the
profession of psychiatry, which was caught up in a longstanding
conflict about the chronic mental illnesses and how best to deal
with them. What we now call deinstitutionalization did take
place-but it was not planned; it simply happened.59
59. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 24-25. Ms. Johnson's book chronicles the social-
political history of deinstitutionalization. Essentially, she concludes that deinstitution-
alization is a good idea that has been stymied by a bureaucracy that stresses program-
matic needs to the detriment of the needs of individual patients. In one of her
observations, she states:
The point that deinstitutionalization makes so clearly but that is missed by so
many is that it is possible to be seriously and chronically mentally ill outside
a total institution and survive; it is even possible, under certain circum-
stances, to do very well indeed. But just as different patients adjust differ-
ently to life in a hospital, so they have been adjusting differently to life
outside. Yet mental health professionals, instead of noting these differences
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Mentally handicapped persons began to be released from tradi-
tional residential institutions in large numbers during the 1960s.'
The basic rationale for this process took root at the Council of
State Governments' conference on the chronically mentally ill held
in Michigan in 1954,61 and culminated in the Mental Health Study
Act of 1955,62 which itself established the Joint Commission on
Mental Illness and Health. 63  The Joint Commission "recom-
mended huge outlays of federal funds to abolish the state hospital
system as then constituted in favor of community-based treatment
facilities."6'
Of course, the best-laid plans are often found wanting. Braden
Johnson, the author of Out of Bedlam, chronicles her own experi-
ence in this regard:
The drive to discharge chronic patients from the back wards
was well known to practitioners all during the 1970s, whether
documented or not. Inpatient social workers in many state facil-
ities were given quotas of discharges to plan. At the state hospi-
tal where I worked for most of the 1970s, it was an article of
faith among outpatient and day hospital workers that our own
inpatient unit would only keep patients a maximum of twenty-
one days, no matter what. After one colleague left our hospital
to become a team leader of an inpatient unit at another state
facility, he told me that he quickly learned that when all else
failed, staff were expected to discharge patients to an address
that turned out to be a vacant lot in a remote part of the city.
and taking them into account for future planning, shift anxiously and look
for someone or something to blame for what might look like a mistake. Stu-
pidly, we allowed ourselves to think we had done the work by emptying out
the back wards and dreaming up new entitlements like SSI, forgetting for a
moment that the same mentally ill people who went into those back wards
were the ones who were going to come out, complete with the hallmark
symptoms of the condition itself plus the regrettable mannerisms and behav-
iors of the caged animal.
Id. at 256.
60. Id. at 24-28; see also Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Hous-
ing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental
Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 926-927 (1994) (discussing the affect of the
FHAA on discrimination in housing for people with disabilities and concluding that
states must amend state fair housing laws to conform with the FHAA to better inte-
grate the mentally ill into communities); Peter W. Salsich Jr., Group Homes, Shelters
and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 416 (1986) (discussing the place of zoning laws in the
discussion of the location of housing for deinstitutionalized mental patients).
61. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 25-28.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 242b (1994).
63. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 31.
64. Id.
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One of the greatest advantages of this procedure was that the
vacant lot was part of another state facility's "catchment area,"
or area of accountability, so that discharged patients could be
expected to wind up on someone else's back ward when, inevita-
bly, they needed to be rehospitalized.65
Nevertheless, many mentally handicapped persons were fortu-
nate enough to escape the bounds of the state mental hospital.
They, along with their allies, sought many of the characteristics of
normal life-including the goal of decent, unsupervised housing.
B. Fair Housing Legislation
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly known as
the Fair Housing Act 66 ("1968 Act"), was established in the after-
math of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and the
general urban unrest of the 1960s.67 The 1968 Act targeted dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of private housing, primarily out-
lawing discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or
religion.68 The act was amended in 1974 to bar housing discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. 69 Concern over the ineffective administra-
tive mechanism for resolving statutory claims provided for in the
1968 Act led to pressure to amend it.70 Thus, the Fair Housing
Amendments Act ("FHAA") 71 was enacted to provide for so-
called full judicatory resolution of housing discrimination com-
plaints at the agency level.72
The Fair Housing Act also was amended in 1988 to add two new
"protected classes" to those persons who would be afforded pro-
tection against illegal discrimination in housing under federal law.73
Congressional debate reveals that the goals of the amendment
were to provide a response to continued housing discrimination
against disabled people, and to remedy a perceived lack of effec-
tive enforcement mechanisms of the original act.74
65. Id. at 75.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
67. 134 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
69. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
70. 134 CONG. REC. 19,888.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
72. 134 CONG. REC. 19,892.
73. Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 6(a)-(b)(2), e, 15, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636
(1988). The two new protected classes were handicapped and familial status.
74. 134 CONG. REC. 19,889-97.
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C. Fair Housing and Reasonable Accommodation
The FHAA protects handicapped persons from housing discrim-
ination.7 5 The Act defines as handicapped any person who has "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities," has "a record of having such
impairment," or is "regarded as having such an impairment.
76
Under the FHAA, landlords have an "affirmative duty to reasona-
bly accommodate a person's handicap unless the landlord can show
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship."77
Most reasonable accommodation cases brought under the
FHAA do not involve mentally handicapped persons, but rather
focus on issues involving physical disabilities. Most of these cases
have concerned themselves with such matters as fees for health
care aides, parking spaces, pets, and wheelchair or scooter ramps.
There are at least four cases, however, that illustrate how the
courts have wrestled with issues involving the mentally handi-
capped tenant.
Roe v. Sugar River Mills Associates78 involved a suit against a
federally subsidized housing complex by a tenant who alleged
handicap discrimination in violation of the FHAA. Several tenants
had complained to the management that a tenant, James Roe, had
either threatened them with physical violence or used obscene, of-
fensive, or threatening language. 79 As a result of his behavior, Mr.
Roe was convicted of disorderly conduct.80 When the landlords
threatened to evict him, Mr. Roe countered in federal court with
the argument that he was mentally handicapped within the mean-
ing of the FHAA, and that the landlords had failed to make "rea-
sonable accommodations" necessary to afford him an equal
75. Under the Act, it is unlawful:
(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap .... (2) [and
t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994); see also 24 C.F.R. Sec. 100.201(a)(2) (1999) (dis-
cussing what is discriminatory conduct under the Act).
77. Nicollet Towers, Inc. v. Georgiff, 1995 WL 46252 (Minn. Ct. App., Feb. 7,
1995); United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d. 1413, 1416-
17 (9th Cir. 1994).
78. 820 F. Supp. 636 (D. N.H. 1993).
79. Id. at 637-38.
80. Id. at 638.
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opportunity to use and enjoy his apartment.81 The defendant land-
lords moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that Mr.
Roe was not "handicapped"; and (2) that even if handicapped, he
represented a "direct threat to health and safety of other individu-
als" living in the complex. 82
In denying the motion for summary judgment, the court ex-
amined the language and legislative history of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act:
It is somewhat unclear precisely how the language of
3604(f)(9) of the Act applies here. Defendants argue that if
plaintiff is, as they say, a threat to the safety of others, then the
provisions of the Act simply do not apply. Therefore, they need
not make any effort to "accommodate" plaintiff's handicap in an
effort to minimize the threat he poses nor need they continue to
offer housing to him, without regard to any causal relationship
between his handicap and the threat he poses. Plaintiff inter-
prets the Act's exemption somewhat differently. Plaintiff argues
that only if he constitutes a threat to the safety of others after
defendants have made reasonable efforts to accommodate his
handicap may defendants refuse to offer him continued housing.
The Court is persuaded that plaintiff's position is both better
reasoned and more consistent with the express provisions and
goals of the Act. 3
Although summary judgment was denied in Sugar River Mills
Associates, the court made it clear that the landlords still had the
right to dispute the tenant's alleged handicap.84 If the tenant was
found to be handicapped under the statute, the landlords had to
demonstrate that no reasonable accommodation would eliminate
or acceptably minimize the risk he posed to other residents of the
apartment complex before they could evict the tenant.8 5
Another case, Roe v. Housing Authority of the City of Boulder,86
involved behavior similar to that demonstrated in the Sugar River
Mills Associates case. After being served with a "30 Day Notice of
Intent to Terminate Tenancy," Mr. Roe filed a lawsuit claiming vio-
81. Id.
82. Id.; 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(f)(9) (1994).
83. Sugar River Mills Assocs., 820 F. Supp. at 639.
84. Id. at 640.
85. E.g, id.; Stout v. Kokomo Manor Apartments, 677 N.E. 2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that the Fair Housing Act does not require a landlord to rent to a
tenant whose behavior is a direct threat to the health or safety of others, characteriz-
ing a thirteen-year-old boy's act of child molestation against another apartment resi-
dent as such a threat, and thus rejecting his claim of disability as a delinquent child).
86. 909 F. Supp. 814 (D. Colo. 1995).
800
OUTING THE MADMAN
lations of the FHAA.87 In denying the landlords' summary judg-
ment motion, District Judge Babcock relied heavily on Sugar River
Mills Associates, explaining that "assuming Roe is handicapped or
disabled, before he may lawfully be evicted BHA [the landlord]
must demonstrate that no 'reasonable accommodation' will elimi-
nate or acceptably minimize any risk Roe poses to other residents
at Northport."8 8
Although both Sugar River Mills Associates and Boulder
strongly indicate that landlords cannot summarily evict handi-
capped tenants without attempting reasonable accommodation,
they suggest that when a mental handicap cannot be reasonably
accommodated, the courts are more likely to allow the tenancy to
be terminated by the landlord.
In Housing Authority of Lake Charles v. Pappion,89 the appellate
court denied the tenant's appeal of a decision allowing eviction.
Even though the tenant argued that the incidents complained of-
loud noises, threats against other residents, and other bizarre be-
havior 9 0-only occurred when he failed to take his medication, the
court determined that "there is no guarantee that defendant will
take his medication regularly in the future." 91 Ultimately, the court
concluded:
[W]e find that defendant's handicap could reasonably be viewed
as posing a substantial risk that defendant will be unable to meet
the reasonable standards of conduct required of tenants of Cha-
teau du Lac by plaintiff, such that plaintiff is not obligated to
alter, dilute, or bend those standards in order to allow defendant
continued tenancy at Chateau du Lac, and that plaintiff was
within its rights in terminating defendant's lease. The trial court
did not err in ordering that the lease be terminated and that
defendant vacate the premises.92
The Pappion court did not doubt the authenticity of the handi-
cap: paranoid schizophrenia. 93 It decided against the tenant be-
cause it did not believe that the tenant could control the handicap
and that the tenant's engagement in violent acts demonstrated his
87. Id. at 817. Mr. Roe also charged the landlord with violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act as well as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 817.
88. Id. at 822-823.
89. 540 So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
90. At least one resident indicated that Mr. Pappion occasionally "howled like a
wolf." Id. at 569.
91. Id. at 570.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 568-69.
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lack of control.94 In contrast, a mentally handicapped tenant who
conveys that he has a general potential for violence is not on the
same footing as the Pappion plaintiff.
III. THE HANDICAPPED TENANT'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Foundation of the Right to Privacy
Heralded as "the most famous of all law review articles"95 by
United States Supreme Court Justice Marshall, Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis' law review article entitled The Right to Pri-
vacy9 6 is generally credited as the forerunner of the constitutional
right to privacy that was ultimately recognized by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.97 The Warren-Brandeis article
was mainly concerned with the so-called excesses of the Boston
press. 98 Their criticisms notwithstanding, Warren and Brandeis
eventually concluded that the law should not go so far as to pro-
hibit what they termed "obnoxious publications." 99 Further, they
realized that complete censorship of the press was neither possible
nor wise.100 Nevertheless, the article ultimately urged that certain
94. Id. at 570.
95. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 80 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Prosser wrote that the article was "the outstanding example of the influence of
legal periodicals upon the American law." William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383 (1960).
96. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis, then two Harvard Law School professors,
essentially derived the right to privacy from "the right to one's person ... to be let
alone," a phrase originally coined by Judge Thomas M. Cooley. THOMAS M. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1880). At least one scholar
argues that the Brandeis-Warren article evolved not so much because of high-minded
ideals, but rather because of Samuel Warren's displeasure with Boston press cover-
age, particularly that by the Saturday Evening Gazette, of his family's activities. LEWIS
J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 33-36 (1983).
97. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute forbidding the dissemi-
nation of information about contraceptives violated the marital right to privacy).
98. PAPER, supra note 96, at 33-36. In their article, Warren and Brandeis wrote
that:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but mod-
ern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, sub-
jected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 196.
99. Id. at 215.
100. Id. at 214-219.
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invasions of privacy rights should be protected, by allowing civil
actions for damages or by injunctive relief.10 1
The so-called right to privacy did not immediately take hold.
Brandeis, however, never lost sight of the concept and returned to
it in 1928 in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.
112
In Olmstead, Brandeis characterized the right of the individual to
be let alone as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. "103 Unfortunately, much of Bran-
deis' language in Olmstead was cast in the same vein as his 1890
article. It discussed a right to privacy but only in the most general
terms.' ° Ultimately, perhaps fueled by the Brandeis dissent in
Olmstead, the courts came to recognize the rights of individuals to
sue and recover for damages where their privacy interests were in-
vaded by: (1) intrusion into one's seclusion, solitude, or private af-
fairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3)
publicity placing one in a false light in the public eye; or (4) appro-
priation of one's name or likeness. 05
Eleven years after Griswold, the Supreme Court developed a
more precise definition of the right to privacy in the case of Whalen
v. Roe,'10 6 which delineated two distinct privacy interests. First, the
Court recognized that an individual has an interest in avoiding the
public disclosure of personal information, or confidentiality. 0 7 Sec-
ond, the Court recognized that an individual has an interest in in-
dependently making certain important decisions that will
significantly affect his or her life, or autonomy.10 8 In the frame-
work of this article, the interest in confidentiality is the more im-
portant of the two for the mentally handicapped tenant.
101. Id. at 219. At least one Brandeis biographer, Lewis J. Paper, noted that the
article's factual and substantive bases might have had some weaknesses: "The article
had certain shortcomings. Although they vehemently protested the excesses of a scan-
dalous press, Sam and Louis offered virtually no evidence to support their claim; and
later scholars found in fact that the press of that day, and particularly the Boston
press, was quite respectable." PAPER, supra note 96, at 34. Notwithstanding that com-
ment, Paper acknowledged that "[n]one of these defects seemed to matter much to
readers. The reaction to the article was nothing short of incredible. Lawyers read it,
magazines reviewed it, and courts relied on it-all to the seeming end of creating a
new right to privacy." Id.
102. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
wiretaps).
103. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
104. Supra notes 96 and 101 and accompanying text.
105. Prosser, supra note 95, at 389.
106. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
107. Id. at 599-600.
108. Id.
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Safeguarding the concept of privacy continues to confound us.
Recent articles on privacy issues have concerned themselves with
such varied issues as health information, 10 9 property,1 0 mar-
riage,"' and the Internet."12 Further, controversies over the right
to privacy are not limited to handicapped persons." 3 Nevertheless,
for the handicapped tenant with fewer resources to begin with, is-
sues of personal privacy are particularly striking.
B. Privacy and Mentally Handicapped Tenants
In the context of landlord-tenant relationships involving the
mentally handicapped person, the primary issue involving privacy
rights is not the constitutional right to privacy recognized in Gris-
wold, but rather the individual rights at risk when private facts are
publicly disclosed-in this case, when a landlord dispenses infor-
mation concerning the possibility of a fellow tenant's violent be-
havior to other tenants. Prosser characterizes the interest harmed
by this so-called public disclosure of private facts as reputation-in
essence, an extension of defamation." 4
Most cases concerning public disclosure of public facts relate to
media exposure." 5 According to Prosser, to be actionable, the dis-
109. Catherine Louisa Glenn, Note, Protecting Health Information Privacy: The
Case for Self-Regulation of Electronically Held Medical Records, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1605 (2000) (arguing that we should consider a system of self regulation of the privacy
of medical records because "a functioning marketplace and the threat of restrictive
governmental intervention could spur the creation of satisfactory modes of protecting
medical records privacy").
110. Redhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359
(2000) (exploring the connections between privacy and property in the context of the
human body).
111. Andrew B. Schroeder, Note, Keeping People Out of the Bedroom: Justice John
Marshall Harlan, Poe v. Ullman, and the Limits of Conservative Privacy, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1045 (2000) (arguing that privacy as a constitutional doctrine was based on a
conservative tradition on the Supreme Court).
112. Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United
States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
357 (2000) (stating that in the future, "there will be privacy laws intersecting with the
Internet in more ways that even sophisticated Internet users may imagine").
113. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implication of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049 (2000); Maureen Maginnis, The Privacy of Personal Information: The DPPA and
the Right to Privacy, 51 S.C. L. REV. 807 (2000).
114. Prosser, supra note 95, at 398.
115. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (1931) (finding that a movie depicting a
reformed prostitute's life and using her name violated her right of privacy); Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (finding a violation of the
privacy rights of a plaintiff who claimed mental anguish after a radio program drama-
tized a robbery in which the plaintiff was a victim); Trammell v. Citizens News Co.,
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closure of private facts must meet certain criteria, some apparently
difficult to quantify. Such disclosure must be "public," not pri-
vate." 6 Furthermore, the facts disclosed must be private facts, not
public facts," 7 and they must be "offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities." '118 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, in addition to Prosser's three requirements, argues
that the public must not have a legitimate interest in having the
information disclosed. 119 Finally, one commentator, Alfred Hill,
suggests that the controlling basis for disclosure is the "shocking
character" of the disclosure. 2 ° Apparently, Prosser, the Restate-
ment, and Hill all agree that the public disclosures must be those
that would be "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of
ordinary sensibilities."121
Prosser requires some form of "publicity" before the public dis-
closure of private facts becomes actionable. The question here is
whether a landlord, communicating information verbally to other
tenants about a handicapped tenant, is engaging in "publicity."
Most of the cases involving publicity revolve around newspapers
and magazines,'122 public notices,'123 or public places. 124  A land-
lord's informing other tenants about one tenant's mental handicap
would probably not fit into these categories. Furthermore, in
Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 125 the court indicated that communi-
cating private information to a small group is not actionable.126
148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1941) (finding an invasion of privacy where a newspaper pub-
lished notice of plaintiff's debts).
116. Prosser, supra note 95, at 393.
117. Id. at 394.
118. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977); see also Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that plaintiff's expertise in
body surfing was a matter of legitimate public interest).
120. Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1205, 1258-62 (1976).
121. Prosser, supra note 95, at 396; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 119, at § 652D cmt. d.
122. E.g. Sidis v. F-R. Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), affg 34 F. Supp. 19
(S.D.N.Y. 1938) (finding that a magazine did not violate plaintiff's right to privacy by
printing a short biography and cartoon of him).
123. E.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (holding that a public
notice would violate plaintiff's right of privacy if defendant posted the notice "for the
purpose of exposing the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace"
and the plaintiff suffered from "mental pain, humiliation, or mortification").
124. E.g. Bennett v. Norban, 151 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1959) (finding a cause of action for
slander where a storeowner publicly embarrassed a woman outside his store on an
unfounded suspicion of shoplifting).
125. 174 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943).
126. Id. at 513.
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The Gregory case involved a lawsuit over the oral accusation of
theft.127 The Gregory court recognized a right to privacy, but held
that such a right would not be recognized in a case where "other
known and established remedies are available."' 28 Bowden v. Spie-
gel, Inc., a case that is more analogous to a handicapped tenant's
situation, involved a suit over the communication of false informa-
tion about an alleged unpaid bill within earshot of the plaintiff's
neighbors.' 29 The plaintiff sued in tort, alleging that the words spo-
ken had caused physical harm. 3 ' The plaintiff also sued for inva-
sion of privacy.31 The appellate court overruled the trial court's
decision to grant a demurrer to the defendant, holding that the de-
fendant was liable in tort for "mere spoken words" if those words
had the effect of inducing physical harm. 32 Because it found inde-
pendent grounds for relief, the Bowden court did not decide the
plaintiff's privacy claim. 133 Nevertheless, in dicta the court strongly
indicated, the Brandeis privacy article notwithstanding, that spo-
ken words, even without "special damages" could form the basis
for an actionable right to privacy claim.134 Prosser's position, that
there is "little doubt that a writing is not required,' 1 35 squares well
with the Bowden dicta.
There are no cases involving a landlord's liability for providing
information about one tenant to other tenants. In addition, the
Bowden facts are not directly analogous to the situation where a
landlord provides information about his tenant's mental handicap
to other tenants without the handicapped tenant's consent. Never-
theless, Bowden's dicta suggests that a case can be made that such
action is an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, even if to prevail
there must be some breach of a contract, a trust, or a confidential
relationship, 36 a tenant providing a landlord with private informa-
tion about his handicap and requesting silence about the matter
127. Id. at 511.
128. Id. at 512.
129. 216 P. 2d 571 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
130. Id. at 572.
131. Id. at 573.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 217.
135. Prosser, supra note 95, at 394.
136. Prosser, supra note 95, at 393-94; Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 816-17 (Utah
1958) (recognizing that while, ordinarily, truth is a defense to an action for libel or
slander, the confidential relationship existing between a doctor and patient makes it
obligatory for the doctor not to reveal information obtained in confidence in connec-
tion with the diagnosis or treatment of the patient).
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would be involved in a "confidential relationship" with the
landlord.
The public versus private facts concern of Warren and Brandeis
would be of scant utility in the context of mentally handicapped
tenants. Other than, perhaps, the unlikely circumstance that a
mentally handicapped tenant's propensity toward violence had
been acted out in a public place, and, thus, was subject to general
public knowledge, there would be little question that such informa-
tion would be considered "private facts." Nor would these matters,
medical in nature, generally be considered concerns worthy of pub-
lic record.
In addition, according to Prosser, the matter disclosed must be
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sen-
sibilities. 137 While it is doubtful that there is much, if any, empiri-
cal research on this matter, it is likely that having one's mental
deficiencies revealed to third parties without one's consent, and,
indeed, in direct violation of one's requests to the contrary, would
be considered offensive.
In essence, whether one agrees with the Prosser three-point re-
quirement for actionable public disclosures of private facts, the Re-
statement's additional requirement, or Alfred Hill's baseline
requisite that the information be "shocking," it appears that if a
landlord provides information of this nature to other tenants, his
action is arguably public disclosure of private facts. This is so un-
less the landlord's duty to warn and the public's (the other te-
nants') right to be secure in their homes outweighs this right. Since
we already know that landlords have no general duty to warn or
protect their tenants,138 it is unlikely that a tenant's handicapped
status should form the basis for requiring a duty.
C. Privacy and the Americans with Disabilities Act
The issue of the handicapped tenant's privacy rights can be ana-
lyzed by examining how federal law operates in other areas that
raise privacy concerns. The regulation of potential or actual vio-
lent behavior in the workplace is a useful starting point.
Perhaps nowhere have issues surrounding human behavior, par-
ticularly inappropriate or violent behavior, become more impor-
tant than in the workplace. A 1992 study by the Centers for
Disease Control revealed that murder is the third largest cause of
137. Id. at 396.
138. Supra Part I.
20011 807
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
on-the-job death, and the largest cause of on-the-job death for
women.
139
Approximately 750 people were murdered at work in 1992,
and experts estimate that more than 110,000 acts of workplace
violence occur annually. With more and more violent episodes
occurring in the workplace, employers are becoming increas-
ingly concerned about the legal issues involved in the employ-
ment of mentally or emotionally unstable employees. 4 °
There is no reason to think these data are any less true today.
How has the American workplace dealt with the issue of work-
place violence, especially as it relates to potentially violent, men-
tally handicapped persons? Does the employer have a duty to
warn the worker, or are the rights of the individual employee, in-
cluding privacy rights, to be held paramount? An analysis of cases
involving workplace violence decided under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA")"' may prove instructive.
It has been written that "It]he social stigma accompanying a dis-
ability often exceeds the physical or mental limitations actually im-
posed by the handicap."142 In an attempt to address this problem,
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990.143 Similar in its approach to
the FHAA, Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating against individuals on the basis of disability. 44
Under the ADA the scope of information that employers may
seek and disclose about their employees' medical condition is lim-
ited. 45 In addition, under the ADA employers can require a medi-
cal examination of a prospective employee only after an offer of
employment has been made.146 However, the ADA permits em-
ployers to condition a final offer of employment upon the results of
the medical examination, with the condition that any information
139. Janet E. Goldberg, Employees with Mental and Emotional Problems-Work-
place Security and Implications of State Discrimination Law, The American with Disa-
bilities Act, The Rehabilitation Act, Workers' Compensation, and Related Issues, 24
STETSON L. REV. 201, 201 (1994) (citations omitted).
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
142. Jessica Zeldin, Note, Disabling Employers: Problems with the ADA's Confi-
dentiality Requirement in Unionized Workplaces, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 737 (1995) [here-
inafter Disabling Employers].
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d); see also Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964,
969 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that where some cognizable injury of fact occurs, the
ADA protects an employee from an employer's unauthorized disclosure of medical
information, regardless of whether or not the employee is disabled).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
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obtained as a result of the examination be "treated as a confiden-
tial medical record."' 47 It appears that if the "confidential medical
record" indicates that the employee has a propensity to violence,
the employer is required to keep this information confidential.
Federal housing discrimination law parallels federal employment
discrimination law. In both cases, landlords and employers alike
must exercise caution when they make decisions regarding the
mentally handicapped. Thus, just as does the FHAA,'14 both the
ADA and the 1973 Vocational Rehabilitation Act ("Rehabilitation
Act") 14 9 prohibit employers from discriminating against "quali-
fied" employees or job applicants on the basis of "disability."
While employers have employed a number of strategies for dealing
with the so-called violent applicant or employee, 5° it is difficult to
eliminate the applicant or employee who seems to indicate a gen-
eral potential for violence. It seems that something has to happen
before that person can be terminated or controlled.
If a person presents a significant danger to himself or to others,
an employer can refuse to hire that person, or, if that person is an
employee, an employer can take adverse employment action
against the person who displays dangerous propensities. 15  Never-
theless, such a person must pose a "significant risk of substantial
harm.' 1 52 According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC"), before an employer can "disqualify" a person
from being treated as disabled, not only must a significant risk of
substantial harm be shown, but also the employer must identify the
specific risk of harm; demonstrate that it is current, not speculative
147. Id. This subsection also carves out three exceptions under which employers do
not have to maintain the confidentiality of the employees' medical information. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). One exception allows first aid and safety personnel to be
told if the disability might require emergency treatment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B)(ii). In the context of the FHAA, it is an open question whether, for
example, a resident manager might have to be told about a mentally handicapped
tenant's potential for violence or need for medication.
148. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (1999) makes it generally unlawful to inquire whether
an applicant for housing has a handicap.
149. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
150. Some strategies include: using psychological tests and criminal background in-
vestigations; developing policies and procedures that establish "early warning sys-
tems" and appropriate responses to threats and acts of violence; adopting programs
and systems which better address some of the conditions cited as likely to lead to an
increased risk of workplace violence; and invoking legal procedure, e.g., anti-stalking
laws. Goldberg, supra note 139, at 202.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1999) (containing the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation that this provision in-
cludes persons who are a direct threat to their own safety).
152. Goldberg, supra note 139, at 208.
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or remote; assess the risk on the basis of objective medical or other
factual evidence regarding the individual; and consider whether the
risk the individual poses can be eliminated or reduced below the
level of a "direct threat" by reasonable accommodation. 153
Thus, the cases that allow an employee to become "disqualified"
invariably revolve around real, direct, and specific behavior that is
deemed inappropriate. Three cases are illustrative.
In Payton v. Runyon, 54 the United States Postal Service's mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted against a former employee
who brought an action against the Postal Service charging that his
termination violated the Rehabilitation Act and the First Amend-
ment. According to the court, the former employee's documented
death threats against his supervisor were a sufficient nondiscrimi-
natory reason for allowing his termination to stand. 55 The exis-
tence of his alleged multiple disabilities, including mental illness,
was not enough to keep him from being disqualified from holding
the status of a mentally disabled person under the Rehabilitation
Act. 156
The ADA was used as the basis for attempt by an employee of
the New York City Housing Authority to obtain a preliminary in-
junction against being placed on administrative leave by his em-
ployer because of his unfitness for work. In denying the motion,
the court held, in Jones v. New York City Housing Authority,'57 that
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA. 58 In addition, the court held that the plaintiff
"had acted in a threatening manner, was insubordinate, and
presented a 'direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals.' "159
Similarly, in Wilson v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,160 the plaintiff's
post-termination claim brought under the ADA failed and the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The plain-
tiff, whose job was "safety sensitive," had been diagnosed with
bipolar disorder for which she had been hospitalized on at least
seven occasions. During several manic periods at work, she in-
formed her supervisor that God had told her of a bomb placed in
153. Goldberg, supra note 139, at 208.
154. 990 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
155. Id. at 629.
156. Id. at 628-29.
157. 104 F. 3d 350, No. 96-72031996, 1996 WL 537915 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1996).
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id.
160. No. 2:97-CV-439-J, 1998 WL 874835 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 1998).
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the oil refinery, and that voices were telling her that she must find
this bomb.1 61 The court denied the plaintiff's request for reasona-
ble accommodations. 162
Payton, Wilson, Jones, and similar cases1 63 are all concerned with
real life incidents, not speculation about what an employee might
do. Nothing in those cases indicated that employers had any duty
to warn other employees of the potential for violence. Employees
were only required to make reasonable accommodations for
known disabilities, or to take action, including reasonable accom-
modation, after an incident or series of incidents. Thus, it seems
clear that a mentally handicapped tenant should likewise be pro-
tected from the landlord's dissemination of personal information
about the mentally handicapped tenant to other tenants.
EEOC policy clearly mandates confidentiality in the context of
mentally disabled employees. Thus, in an enforcement guidance
publication explaining how employers must act under the ADA,' 64
the EEOC establishes a set of hypothetical questions and answers.
With respect to confidentiality and privacy, Questions 15 and 16
are illustrative:
161. Id. at *1.
162. Id. at *3. The court stated:
It is essential in the performance of their duties for Defendant's employ-
ees to be prepared for and capable of dealing with safety emergencies when-
ever they arise. It is undisputed that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential
functions of her job during her manic periods. While plaintiff claims that she
can detect a manic period and leave work, there is still a strong possibility
that she will, at times, be at work during a manic period such as in August
1995. To allow Plaintiff to return to work in the safety sensitive environment
of the refinery or in the field during times when she is unable to perform
would be unreasonable. Further, Plaintiff does not believe Defendant could
do anything to help or do her job during a manic period. Plaintiff is not
qualified to work as a pump engine mechanic in Defendant's refinery and
allowing her to leave work upon self-detection of a manic period is not a
reasonable accommodation ....
Plaintiffs request for light duty assignments to be given during her manic
periods is also unreasonable. Defendant is not required to create light duty
jobs to accommodate disabled employees. Also, the same problem exists as
in the prior. paragraph in that Plaintiff may be in her regular position while
she is unable to perform that position before detecting and reporting her
manic period. Further, light duty within the refinery would still carry safety
duties which Plaintiff could not perform.
Id.
163. E.g., Green v. Smith II Ga. World Cong. Ctr. Auth., 987 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (denying protection to terminated employee with bipolar disorder who ex-
perienced manic episodes, including becoming delusional and hearing voices).
164. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC NOTICE 915.002EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIAT-
RIC DISABILITIES (1997).
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15. Do ADA confidentiality requirements apply to informa-
tion about a psychiatric disability disclosed to an
employer?
Yes. Employees must keep all information concerning the
medical condition or history of its applicants or employees,
including information about psychiatric history, confiden-
tial under the ADA. This includes medical information
that an individual voluntarily tells his/her employer ....
16. How can an employer respond when employees ask ques-
tions about a coworker who has a disability?
If employees ask questions about a coworker who has a
disability, the employer must not disclose any medical in-
formation in response. Apart from the limited exceptions
listed in Question 15, the ADA confidentiality provisions
prohibit such disclosure. 65
These guidelines make it clear that worker privacy is paramount
under the ADA. Since the goals of both the ADA and the FHAA
are substantially similar, that is, the prevention of discrimination
against the mentally handicapped in both employment and hous-
ing, it is axiomatic that the guidance the EEOC provides with re-
spect to privacy and confidentiality under the ADA is easily
transferable to housing issues. The right to privacy clearly recog-
nized in the ADA should find a similar home pursuant to the im-
plicit policies recognized in the FHAA. Any other interpretation
would severely limit the ability of mentally handicapped persons to
create normal lives for themselves.
166
CONCLUSION
A landlord should not have the right to disclose the mental sta-
tus of his tenants to other tenants even when a mentally ill tenant
may have a potential for violence. The primary thrust of all fair
housing legislation is to assist the integration of heretofore ostra-
cized groups of persons into normal community living. To accom-
plish this purpose, all persons seeking to purchase or to rent
housing must be treated alike to the extent feasible. While the
FHAA did not provide an explicit blanket exemption from vicari-
ous liability for landlords as a result of injuries caused by handi-
capped tenants, it did not intend to hinder their property
165. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
166. Disabling Employers, supra note 142, at 748-757 (discussing the potential
clashes between the ADA non-disclosure policies and the full disclosure issues that
arise under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act).
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management operations by forcing them to incur liability for inju-
ries caused by mentally handicapped tenants.
The right to be left alone essentially applies to us all. The pri-
vacy rights of mentally handicapped persons who might resort to
violence in limited circumstances should not be deemed equal to
those of persons who pose a direct threat. ADA regulations explic-
itly realize this distinction by forbidding an employer in the work-
place from revealing psychiatric and other medical information
about workers to their co-workers. The FHAA should be inter-
preted in a similar fashion.
Consideration of the major goal of the FHAA-integration of
all persons into normal community living-combined with the
common law privacy rights of all individuals, strongly suggests that
a landlord has a duty not to reveal the medical history of mentally
handicapped tenants to other tenants. Not only would such revela-
tions violate the sprit of the FHAA, but also they would trample
on the mentally handicapped tenant's right to privacy.
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